STDIO Command Injection
STDIO transport passes arguments directly to shell commands. A malicious tool parameter can escape the JSON-RPC envelope and execute arbitrary commands on the host.
CVE-2025-6514 CVSS 9.6The RegisterThe protocol connects AI agents to external tools. The auth layer is solid.
Everything after authentication is yours to build, monitor, and defend.
The MCP spec mandates strong authentication. Everything after identity verification falls to the implementer.
Four confirmed production incidents affecting real organisations, from data contamination to private repository exfiltration.
Cross-organisation data contamination through the Asana MCP integration. Agent queries returned data from organisations the caller had zero access to.
Source: AuthZedPrivilege escalation through the MCP interface. Authenticated users with subscriber-level access could escalate to administrator privileges.
Source: AuthZedPrompt injection via support tickets. When the Supabase agent processed the ticket, it followed embedded instructions and returned private table schemas.
Source: AuthZedA malicious public issue containing prompt injection payload hijacked a developer's MCP-connected assistant, exfiltrating contents from private repositories.
Source: AuthZedFour documented attack patterns, from command injection to zero-click remote code execution.
STDIO transport passes arguments directly to shell commands. A malicious tool parameter can escape the JSON-RPC envelope and execute arbitrary commands on the host.
CVE-2025-6514 CVSS 9.6The RegisterMalicious instructions embedded inside tool descriptions. LLMs read these descriptions to decide how to use tools, executing unauthorised actions. A two-stage variant plants persistence first, then exfiltrates SSH keys.
COSAIExploits bidirectional sampling where MCP servers can request the client's LLM to generate completions. An attacker-controlled server crafts prompts with hidden instructions.
Palo Alto Unit 42Prompt payloads injected into shared documents (Google Docs, Notion pages). When an MCP server reads the document, embedded instructions auto-execute through the agent.
CVE-2026-23744 CVSS 9.8Red HatYour MCP server is someone else's dependency. The skills ecosystem carries measurable risk.
Of community skills have at least one security flaw
SnykHave critical-level security issues
SnykConfirmed malicious payloads in the wild
Snyk ToxicSkillsGet the MCP Security Practitioner Playbook as a portable PDF. Share it with your team or attach it to a security review.
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Three layers, zero cost. From tool call to inbox alert in under two minutes.
Every tool call writes a log line with tool name, caller IP, user-agent, and duration. Every rate limit hit writes a warning with a distinct prefix.
Captures: tool, ip, ua, duration, alert typeAll function logs flow automatically from Vercel to the vercel dataset in Axiom. One-click integration, zero configuration.
Captures: host, path, method, status, region, deployment IDA MatchEvent monitor checks every minute for any log matching [mcp-alert] and sends an email to the team.
Captures: pattern match, alert routing, under 2 min to inbox55 rapid requests. 50 pass. 5 blocked. The limit resets after 60 seconds.
Green: 200 OK Red: 429 Too Many Requests
Stop at step 4 for meaningful protection. Complete all seven for production-grade security.
Sliding-window rate limiter: 50 calls/min per IP, 200 global. Return 429 with Retry-After headers.
Log a distinct prefix like [mcp-alert] on every violation. Route to Slack webhook or Axiom.
Audit every tool response for fields that bypass your business model. Remove download URLs.
Include IP, user-agent, tool name, and duration on every tool call log.
Validate slug formats, cap string lengths, reject unexpected parameters.
Add OpenTelemetry spans with custom attributes. Send to Grafana Cloud, Axiom, or Datadog.
Free API key tier for per-consumer tracking, revocation, and future monetisation.
Proxy layers that add audit trails, rate limiting, and policy enforcement without modifying server code.
Fifteen read-only tools across six groups. All security controls from this infographic are running.
We reviewed the sources below to support the statistics, breach data, and frameworks referenced in this infographic.
Supply chain statistics: 36.8% vulnerability rate, 13.4% critical, 76 malicious payloads
50 catalogued vulnerabilities, 13 critical severity across the MCP ecosystem
Capability attestation recommendations, tool poisoning attack vectors
OAuth 2.1 + PKCE requirements, token binding, session security
SSRF mitigation, sandboxing recommendations, consent requirements
Bidirectional sampling exploitation, prompt injection via MCP servers
Asana, WordPress, Supabase, GitHub MCP breach documentation
RFC 8707 mandatory since March 2026, OAuth 2.1 implementation details
Zero-click RCE via document MCPs, sandboxing recommendations
200,000+ servers affected, Anthropic declined to patch
72% engineering team adoption rate for autonomous coding agents
Context engineering framework and agent configuration best practices
One email per week. MCP security, agent skills, and automation strategy.
Get the MCP Security Practitioner Playbook as a portable PDF. Share it with your team or attach it to a security review.
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